“camera”
. . . comes from the Latin phrase camera obscura, which means “dark chamber.” Used to describe the original devices used for projecting an image, which were essentially dark rooms with a small hole that allowed light to enter and project an upside-down image on the opposite wall.
1 /
K. walks along the lake as he decides how to keep moving. The god who claimed to make his followers fishers of men has erred: the man on the boat catches no fish. Instead he pulls up a rosewood dresser filled with the words of a stranger. A stranger that feels strangely like him. This is the repetition: we recover ourselves across time, in various lakes and texts, in the book inside a book discussed by Hilarius Bookbinder who happens upon Stages on Life’s Way inside an old bureau. The bookbinder becomes a publisher when he decides to print a three-part text, written by three different authors, each of whom he forgot to return their bound texts. His sense of duty drives him to publish the books, and all three are bound together by nothing except the uncanny accident of their going unnoticed across time. Hilarius is thus cast into the role of pseudo-editor by accident and happenstance. It would take a poet or a god to divine meaning from this.
2 /
3 /
It has been called a sequel to Either/Or, which was published two years earlier.
It was the last of K.’s works to be published under the veil of pseudonymity.
It is “the richest of all I have written, but it is difficult to understand,” K. said of “‘Guilty?’/’Not Guilty?’” — the unhappy love reconfigured as a diary drawn from the depths.
4 /
“It is a valuable find, and I feel that I am under obligation to advertise it,” Kierkegaard writes in “Advertisement,” the prefatory note to the “Guilty/Not Guilty” section.
And “Guilty/Not Guilty” is truly the Eden of his either/or. K renders this “passion narrative” in the form of an epistolary diary: a series of letters by Quidham to himself concerning the subject of a broken engagement. Quidham’s Diary ravages the genre-boundary between the private diary and the public text, for the entries retrace the same days and bumble over the same streets in the same year where the speaker keeps running into himself whenever he sees “Her.” Or whenever she is recollected.
5 /
The motto of Quidham's Diary is inscribed on the following page: Periisem nisi periisem. Kierkegaard culled the phrase from his own diaries, which would later be published posthumously as Journals— a title that downplays the role he imagined for thinking-as-writing.
“cameră”
(n.) “room” or “chamber” in Romanian
November 1794.
After completing his university studies in philosophy, Georg Phillip Friedrich Hardenberg fell in love with Sophie von Kuhn. She was twelve years old when the coup de foudre occurred. Unlike Dante, Novalis went after his Beatrice in the flesh. The two were betrothed when she was thirteen. A few months after their betrothal, Sophie became deathly ill. She died at the age of 15 years, and this event was the world — and its end – to Georg.
The ideal of Sophie died along with the person, and became the basis of his lyrical turn. Hymns to the Night was published in 1800. Georg had become a poet. But he had also become “Novalis,” this character marked by the creation of a “new beginning” — a man who could no longer exist entirely as Georg Phillip Friedrich Hardenberg, the husband of Sophie.
Summer 1798.
In the year following Sophie’s death, Novalis imagined writing about Goethe as a natural scientist, drawing his literary work into the whole of his life. Novalis journaled about Goethe’s journals within his own, writing in the company of his ghosts. And so Novalis wrote . . . “Journals are actually the first books to be written in common. Writing in company is an interesting symptom giving us an inkling of a great development in authorship. Perhaps one day people will write, think and act as a mass. Entire communities, even nations, will undertake One Work.”
The end of the singular “public” which has been displaced by the possibility of a conversation with the world. But what meaning can the private or personal have for this conception of the public? Reality would be displaced from the agora to the interior chambers of the heart and mind, as experienced subjectively.
Novalis stares at her portrait and tries to reconcile the image he sees with the human he knew. Reality, he thinks, can only exist in the fragmented, partial knowledge of all participating authors. The need to write the book justifies its existence; no other justification is needed.
Midnight (the time of metaphor)
Novalis is alone with his grief. The desire to understand Sophie, the longing to share the mutual understanding that characterized the romantic ideal of his time, is gone. The only reality Novalis has is his own. Ironically, it is only through the Other – the beloved, the absent, the Sophie – that Novalis realizes his “infinite.” The concept of infinity becomes the space of true speech. And an impossibility arises, for Novalis depends on Sophie to reach the ideal but, due to the accidents of human life, he will never understand her completely.
At the risk of repeating one’s self . . .
Sophie dies. Novalis stares at death — gives us death as a “specter haunting man’s entire history, his highest cultural achievements.” Jacques Derrida paces the room that will become a “camera” – an eternal chamber that holds the hauntology of here, the ghost is me. Sophie cannot “be” dead. Not literally.
Novalis forges a complicity between time and displeasure in life’s end. “Time originates with displeasure. Thus, all displeasures [are] so long and all joy so short… displeasures are finite like time. Everything finite originates out of displeasure.”
Death becomes the ultimate apocalypse, the culmination of our finiteness, the conclusion to any reality we know. Death makes a void of life’s meaning. Time fucks us up entirely.
. . . but I will not degrade my soul
by learning to know her . . .
Thus does the speaker of Quidham’s Diary vow to keep himself pure at heart.
Every answer begins with anxiety. As does the question it begs.
November 2025
Constantin and Virgilius think that recollection, an idea central to Platonic epistemology, seems complementary to repetition. “Repetition and recollection are the same movement, except in opposite directions, for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, where a genuine repetition is recollected forward,” says Constantin.
In a different camera, Johannes de Silentio, the author of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, draws on Aristotle’s idea of recognition, a moment in theatre when tragedy is realized, in order to offer his own view of recognition as presupposing and dispelling some “prior hiddenness.” But Johannes de Silentio, Constantin, and Vigilius never discuss recognition, recollection, and repetition in relation to one another . . . which is too bad. I mean, if recognition presupposes the condition of hiddenness, then it would precede recollection and repetition, since both recollection and repetition must presuppose some form of recognition in order to occur. The thing that stays hidden without ever being recognized can’t be meaningfully recollected nor can it be meaningfully repeated.
Say Novalis needs a lens to put Sophie’s death in perspective —
lens 1
— the incredible lightness of being that Novalis experienced while in Her presence negated the despair that time unfolds on an Us. The ‘solution’ to the existential crisis lies in the reflection. Reflecting allows us to escape our finiteness by encountering the “absolute joy” that remains “eternal – outside all time.” We turn “displeasure into joy, and with it time into eternity,” Novalis whispered to his Reflection.
lens 2
When Constantin Constantius returns to Berlin in order to replay or reexperience his time in the former lodges next to Gendarmenmarkt, he is mining for repetition. And this repetition – the replay of fond images — is the technical marvel accomplished by the family movie, or even the cinema film watched with a first love. There is a loop into Krapp’s Last Tape…though what Beckett reveals is the subject’s failure to recognize the prior selves. To recognize is a way of claiming: it is recognition that precedes both recollection and repetition. (K avoids this, I think.)
lens 3
It is strange to lose the only thing I’ve never lost before— not since the age of 18, when I wore a bob. It is eerie to watch my hair fall out in clumps without explanation. The discomfort of humans in white coats allows me to abandon the confused woman and step forward to reassure the professionals: “Surely it will be fine.” “Just do what you know.” “How will this medication affect my insomnia?” “I understand that diagnosis is a betting game.” “I know you are doing your best.” “I know you regret how the prescription from four weeks prior only caused more hair to fall from my head.” “I’ll be damned if the sun isn’t extraordinary, even though it visits us less. . .”
lens 4
In his journals from the early 1850’s, K meditates on the forgiveness of sin in relation to how we perceive life’s accidents. He argues for an “altered view” that what God shows us isn’t the “punishment” but rather mercy, so no bad things are an “expression of God’s wrath” but rather a thing of suffering, to be born with God, who knows suffering through Christ. And now, K takes this further, saying that “Punishment is not the pain in itself” since the same identical pain or suffering happens to others as “mere accident.” Instead, “punishment is the idea that this particular suffering is punishment. When this idea is removed, so too, really, is the punishment.”
Socrates never sought to prove the immortality of the soul. Instead, he simply lived as if immortality were a fact about the cosmos. In this sense, says K, if there is no such thing as immortality — if the as if that governed his choices proves to be false — “I still do not regret my choice; for this is the only thing that concerns me.” The choice. The decision. The commitment. A little Pascalian wager with his back against the wall.
lens 5
HE: What drew you to K?
ME: I recognized my own fear of commitment in him.
HE: Oh? But he is deeply committed!
ME: Committed to the thing he can neither see nor prove. Committed to uncertainty.
HE: False. Kierkegaard is committed to certainty. He knows what he knows by faith.
ME: Maybe. But who knows what the conditions of such knowing might be?
HE: You know what you are . . . or when someone says this, you think ‘a writer’.
ME: In our world, this breaks down into various categories, and each has its corresponding affect. I create texts, but what does that make me to you?
HE: A writer.
ME: Johannes de Silentio identifies as a ‘freelancer’ in Fear and Trembling.. . . I identify with K’s decision here, this choice to name the self as a freelancer in order to expand the field of thought. Don’t you think contemporary thought is drained by genre and brand?
HE: K calls himself ‘a kind of poet’ . . . in his journals, in his texts, in his discourses. Kierkegaard was a poet to himself.
ME: I think many philosophers are poets are heart. But taking K at his word, his books refused the given boxes. Prefaces, Either/Or, Postscript: all situate themselves uncomfortably in relation to communicative function because destructive of the text. The countergenre. A creature that offers itself apophatically by insisting on what it is not. He calls Fear and Trembling “a dialectical lyric” but it is also a mix of exegesis, fabulism, social commentary, farce, and dialectical study. He says his Prefaces are “like tuning a guitar, like talking with a child, like spitting out of the window” and I hear him say, look, anything can happen, and everything that does may be an accident. Postscript, the text titled after the P.S., which is the paratext that names itself as an addendum to the original. It tells us that it is a “postscript to crumbs of philosophy,” the son of its father text. The subtitle calls it a “mimic-pathetic– dialectic compilation–an existential contribution,” a promise to break the cherished molds of thought and classification. K. never tells us where to land. He guts the immediate life at stake: he lays the “I” on the line and then, in the final pages, reminds us to leave this useless text, to abandon its author and his musings just as he urged readers to leave Prefaces, that work of “a light-hearted-do-nothing.”
HE: (sighs) Losing your hair is most noticeable to you, A. Other people have to look closely to see what you’re hiding . . .
ME: I’d rather not. Look, I think what continues to provoke me in K is his obsession with finding a justified exception to the ethical.
HE: Sometimes I think take his subjectivity too far. He was going for an absolute, after all.
ME: But an absolute couldn’t absolve him of going for it. The self is disclosed in the reading, the labor of interpretation. There is no system that K wants to create. No temple or ideology. No comfortable institution that would enable the flourishing of police, or their cousins, the pastors.
HE: “I fear no one as I fear myself. Woe unto me in case I were to discover that there had been one deceitful word in my mouth, one single word whereby I had sought to persuade her —”
ME: Ha ha. God’s money in those worries. And maybe that is connected to what I was thinking, namely, how K refuses to tender the coin of the realm —
HE: And that coin is what?
ME: Respectability. Same game, different costumes.
HE: You mean flaying himself on the page in order to make sure that no part is left pure. I’m assuming. His refusal to offer an out.
ME: (nods) This refusal forces us into anxiety about our own choices–his dread becomes our own, the possible life, the one we could have lived if life and work was a thing we wanted to take seriously. Which is to say: existentially. As if eternity is at stake. One must choose.
I have the courage, I think, to doubt everything, to fight, I think, against everything. But the courage to recognize nothing, to possess nothing: that I lack. Most people complain that life is too prosaic, that life is not at all like those novels where lovers are lucky, as for me, I complain that life is not like those novels where one has hardened fathers to fight against, virgins' bedrooms to force open, convent walls to leap over. I have only the pale Figures of the night, stubborn and bloodless, to battle with, and I am the one who gives them life and being.
— Kierkegaard, in a journal entry several years before the Corsair affair
[What does it mean to exist as non-existent? I mean: what is the text Mallarme imagined?]
*
As a child, Flaubert had come to know the story of Anthony in the puppet theatre, later seeing the painting by Brueghel the Younger in the Balbi collection in Genoa. It is clear to him, however, that only the word can deliver what the picture cannot: it alone can leave the rivalry between the world and the book as open as is required.
No painter could show what Flaubert has the Queen of Sheba say to the hermit: “I am not a woman, I am a world.” That the saint uses the book to resist the throng of figures could have been shown iconically; only verbal mastery could intimate that it is the world itself and as a whole that seduces him in every phantasm of vices and mortal sins, against which the book must hold the balance. The spiteful threat with which the phantasmal Queen of Sheba departs the scene is that of the restored desert—Lichtenberg's empty space— penetrating the subject in the only way the loss of the world can be suffered: as boredom. What are the temptations the anchorite must withstand compared with the emptiness they leave behind— unless the book on the wooden desk in the middle of the saint's mud hut could be his world, just as the author's book should be the world of the reader?
— Hans Blumenberg, The Readability of the World














