after (and with) Jeremy Stewart's I, Daniel: An Illegitimate Reading of Jacques Derrida's 'Envois'
“Doubtless, we are several, and I am not as alone as I sometimes say . . .”
— Jacques Derrida, Envois
I
I will begin by identifying an interlocutor named “Jeremy Stewart”, whose book, I, Daniel: An Illegitimate Reading of Jacques Derrida's 'Envois', cites Derrida — “Doubtless, we are several, and I am not as alone as I sometimes say . . .”— page 107. I will begin with a name, a text, and a quotation while acknowledging that my “I” includes others. One of these others took a photo of the above passage a few years ago when poring through Derrida’s Envois, and perhaps it was she who recognized Jeremy’s quotation.
On the same day, a framed photograph fell off the wall and the glass shattered all over the hardwood. I took a photo of this as well, and worked it into a poem that will be published in a book at the end of next month. When coming across Jeremy’s quotation, “recognition” occurred as an immediate perceptual awareness of absence. I felt something was missing, and the feeling chased me into a lingering and somewhat corrosive curiosity. I took my dog for a walk and remembered the photo. Having admitted these coincidences (the photo of the quotation and the broken photo frame), I won’t “begin” again. There is no reason to convince you that beginnings must be rich and verbose. Nothing immaculate exists. No immaculate is actual. “I know what this costs.”
II
In writing about books I have read, or books I have written, or projected works in draft, it is easy to confuse what I have said publicly—- whether spoken or published— with what I have written and left unfinished. There are traces of such things, and it hurts (stings, smarts, burns) to discover that the words remain hidden in my notebooks, severaled in silence.
Uncertainty is where relationship possibilitizes itself, as such, every relationship of value alters its subjects irrevocably, giving them a knowledge that could not have been gained elsewhere. A knowledge about themselves. The touch deforms us, and thus makes us more real, laying the weight of the world in proximity to our bodies and our experience of embodiment. To be touched by another simultaneously wounds us and recreates us.
Derrida said something similar of poetry in a late essay: “No poem without accident, no poem that does not open itself like a wound, but no poem that is not also just as wounding. You will call the poem a silent incantation, the aphonic wound that, of you, from you, I want to learn by heart… The poem falls to me, benediction, coming of (of from) the other.”
Traces allude to the wound without speaking for the wound, or evidencing it. The trace is not a presence so much as “simulacrum of a presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself.” A simulacrum is a representation or imitation of a person or thing.
III
Speaking of inheritance, Derrida: “In my anticipation of death, in my relation to a death to come, a death that I know will completely annihilate me and leave nothing of me behind, there is just below the surface a testamentary desire, a desire that something survive, get left behind or passed on—an inheritance or something that I myself can lay no claim to, that will not return to me, but that will, perhaps, remain.”
IV
Dear reader, forget the photos. Pretend I didn’t mention them. But don’t forget that I lied to you when I scoffed at beginnings and repetition. And don’t forget how I defined recognition in relation to the secret I may have kept.
V
With dinner guests due to arrive in a few hours, I sat in my car in a parking lot where no one could find me and read Peggy Kamuf's essay, "A plus d'un titre," alongside Jeremy’s fabulous monograph, both of which led me to the uncanny moment on September 22, 2001, when Derrida was awarded the Theodore W. Adorno prize in Frankfurt, on this pseudo-date (since the prize was traditionally awarded on September 11 to coincide with Adorno's birthday, which, in this case, coincided with al Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center in New York).
It was cold in the car, cold enough to warrant gloves and earmuffs, an accessory situation that deranged my note-taking efforts, forcing me to consign some thoughts to memory, most of which did not make it through dinner and the evening. Awarded every three years, the Adorno Prize recognizes work ‘in the spirit of the Frankfurt school’ that spans philosophy, social sciences and the arts. None transgressed these boundaries as consistently and kookily as Jacques Derrida, who, in Tympan, insisted that "it is about this multiplicity, perhaps, that philosophy, being itself situated, inscribed and included there, has never been able to reason."
The multiplicity and polyvocality appears in countless texts, including the post-scriptum of On the Name, where Derrida amends his statement about speech, writing, "More than one, forgive me, one must always be more than one in order to speak, there must be several voices…"
On September 20, 2001, looking out at the audience in Frankfurt, Derrida began his speech, “The language of the foreigner” (as translated by Lucie Elvenin), by recounting a dream spoken by a different voice, a spectre that haunted his own work as well as that of the Frankfurt school. He does this for many reasons, but one of them involves language, particularly the connection between Derrida's French and Walter Benjamin's German. Both men, in this scenario, use languages that are not their 'first languages' in order to communicate an insight. Both men indirectly pose questions about fidelity to language in doing so.
“To open this modest statement of my gratitude, I will read a phrase, which one day, one night, Walter Benjamin dreamt in French,” Derrida tells his audience, adding that Benjamin “entrusted it in French” to Gretel Adorno, who had become the wife of Theodor Adorno by the time this letter was addressed to her on 12 October 1939. Walter and Gretel carried on a lively correspondence prior to her marriage, and those letters to Gretel Karplus present us with a richer, more flirtatious slant of both persons. But when Benjamin wrote the quoted letter to Gretel, he was interned in what the French authorities called “a camp de travailleurs voluntaires (voluntary workers’ camp),” as Derrida says, and the banality of that arrangement might have lent the dream a more “euphoric” tone.
In this dream, as described by Derrida, Benjamin said the following to himself in French: “Il s’agissait de changer en fichu une poésie” which Elvenin translates as “It was a case of turning poetry into a kerchief”. But Benjamin “translated this as: Es handelte sich darum, aus einem Gedicht ein Halstuch zu machen,” Derrida says, sharing this German translation with his audience, subtly shifting the terms of his address, while adding that “later we will touch on this ‘fichu’, this kerchief or scarf.” And then — notice how he continues with this plural pronoun— “We will discern in it the letter of the alphabet that Benjamin thought he recognised in his dream. And ‘fichu’, as we will come to, is not any old French word to denote a muffler, shawl or women’s scarf.”
Briefly, Derrida discourses on the 'fichu', a word which “means different things according to whether it is being used as a noun or adjective”:
The fichu – and this is the most obvious meaning in Benjamin’s sentence – designates a shawl, the piece of material that a woman may put on in a hurry, around her head or neck. But the adjective fichu denotes evil: that which is bad, lost, condemned. One day in September 1970, seeing his death approaching, my sick father said to me, ‘I'm fichu.’
After drawing the correspondence between his father's use of the handkerchief to say, ‘I'm fed up with it,’ Derrida addresses his audience: “Do we always dream in bed, at night? Are we responsible for our dreams? Can we answer for them? Suppose I am dreaming now. My dream is a happy one, like Benjamin’s.” Using the plural pronoun gathers the audience into the questions, or makes them, so to speak, answerable for the response. The coincidences here are the name and the date, to quote Paul Celan, namely, that the Adorno Prize itself was to occur on Adorno's birthday, September 11th, which in that year coincided with the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
“I feel I am dreaming—” Derrida tells the audience. To 'feel' that one is dreaming plies the difference between dream and recognition: who am I when I see myself dreaming and what relationship can be said to exist between my dreaming and my personhood? In gently touching this sense of disbelief, Derrida insinuates that the affect isn't limited to the dream as such but related to the confusion between dream and reality, as he seems to suggest in the next line, “Even if the highwayman or the smuggler doesn’t deserve what is happening to him — like the poor student in a Kafka story who believes himself to be called, like Abraham, to the seat reserved for the first in the class — his dream seems happy. Like mine.”
[* These happy-seeming dreams remind me of a conversation between Ernest Bloch and Theodor Adorno about utopia. I'm making a note to come back to it later, if the right corridor appears.]
What is the difference between dreaming and believing that we are dreaming? And, anyway, who has the right to ask that question? The dreamer, plunged deep in his experience of the night, or the dreamer who has woken up? Would a dreamer be able to speak about his dream without waking? Would he know how to name the dream at all? Would he know how to analyse it fairly and even to use the word ‘dream’ knowingly without interrupting and betraying – yes, betraying – sleep?
V
Derrida in Archive Fever.
“A phantom can be thus sensitive to idiom,” Derrida said of the ghosted.
In a note to his Adorno Prize speech, Derrida mentions “an odd coincidence”, namely, the co-incidence of Adorno’s birthday with the September 11 attack by al-Quaeda, which meant that a ceremony honoring the anniversary of a birthday had been postponed due to the prize-winner (Derrida) being in Shanghai. The images of fear and mass murder would be permanently linked to this particular date, a date that connected Adorno to Derrida. “A coincidence of anniversary dates is nothing very odd at all, as Derrida points out in ‘Shibboleth’,” Kamuf writes. What stands out is “the coincidence of coincidences, the more than one coincidence that deserves remark and casts an uncanny shadow in ‘Fichus’.”
Derrida’s notes are notable for how they haunt his writings. One could write a book on less; paratext and punctuation (the asterisk, the footnote, the parenthetical, etc.) are the hauntological grammar of the text. They say what gets ghosted by post-Cartesian philosophy. The plurality of selfhood runs in tandem with the plurality of textual devices that memorialize what is missing, or what academic convention prefers to consign to the dustbin of history due to its overly-speculative nature.
Speculation, the speculative, is specular. It plays with light and mirrors. Physics tells us that specular reflection— the name for any ordinary reflection— is “the mirror-like reflection of waves, such as light, from a surface.”
VII
“By leaving this title in the plural and without article I was making a supplementary and still more equivocal use of the ‘s’ that could cover or include the three uses of the word and highlight the possible plurality of these uses, citing them in advance, as it were.”
— Derrida, Memoirs for Paul de Man
The supplementary in Derrida’s explanation of his plural titling, or severaled titling, calls to mind a passage in Javier Marias' novel, The Man of Feeling, where the protagonist reproaches his live-in girlfriend for abandoning him as he sleeps, allowing him to sleep unmolested, unattended, open to dreams, at risk of dreaming and becoming subject to dreams— which, of course, is the conceit of the novel itself that opens as a dream in a train. The difference between the artist and the philosopher is their response to this question, for where the philosopher refuses the dream, the poet wavers, pauses, allowing the dream to speak, and risking its dangerous influence.
Poets and artists “would acquiesce to the event, and to its exceptional singularity: yes, maybe we can believe and admit that we are dreaming without waking; yes, it is not impossible, sometimes, to say, while sleeping, with our eyes closed or wide open, something like a truth that issues from dreaming, a dream’s meaning and reason, which deserves not to sink into the night of nothingness,” Derrida tells us. Night, here, verges on the abyssal— a space that philosophy often consigns to metaphysics, or to the flaky side of life. And here is where Derrida elects to name Adorno himself, drawing "that lucidity, that light, this Aufklärung of a dreamy discourse on dreams" towards the man whose birth is noted on this date:
What I admire and love about Adorno is that he is someone who never stopped hesitating between the philosopher’s ‘no’ and the ‘yes, maybe, sometimes it happens’ of the poet, writer, essayist, musician, painter, writer of plays or films, and even psychoanalyst. By hesitating between ‘no’ and ‘yes, sometimes, maybe’, he was heir to both. He has taken into account that which the concept, the dialectic even, could not conceive in a singular event, and he has done everything to take on the responsibility of this dual heritage.
What is Adorno suggesting? The difference between dream and reality, that truth to which the ‘no’ of the philosopher calls us back with rigid severity, is what harms, hurts or ‘damages’ (beschädigt) the most beautiful dreams, and leaves instead a mark, a stain (Makel), like a signature. The ‘no’ — in other words, the negativity with which he sees philosophy as opposing the dream — is a wound of which the most beautiful dreams forever bear the scar.
“A passage from Minima Moralia reminds us of this,” Derrida continues, adding that he has chosen the passage for two reasons, the first being that “in it Adorno says that the most beautiful dreams are spoilt, harmed, mutilated, ‘damaged’ (besachädigt), hurt by the waking consciousness that tells us that they are pure-seeming (Schein) in the eyes of reality (Wirklichkeit).” And what stands out to Derrida is the coincidence of the hurt Adorno mentions, this beschädigt that also appears in the book's subtitle, Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben.
Prying at this difference in use, this distance in signification, Derrida deconstructs the title to indicate “not ‘reflections on’ a life that has been hurt, harmed, damaged or mutilated, but ‘reflections from’ such a life, aus dem beschädigten Leben: reflections marked by pain, signed with a wound.”
“Signed with a wound.” — this phrase lies at the center of everything Derrida does, as well as the parts of his language that get folded into lyrical works attempting to gloss his pain without addressing it directly. Like Jean Genet and Artaud, the wound is the site that language returns to as well as the fuel for creation. We are of course talking about circumcision, and his complicated relationship with sacrificial rituals that mark one as a ‘member’ of a group. To my knowledge, Derrida is the only cigar-smoking Parisian flaneur of the solitary attic to theorize his refusal to have his own son circumcised? Given the proper future anterior, Kierkegaard would have good reason to envy what Derrida dared.
VI
This series of thirteen en-vois will be continued, as soon as I get a chance to type my notes…